Uniken International

Guangzhou’s Warning, the Market’s Answer: IATA’s Aviation Energy Forum Meets a Collapsing Crude Market

18 Nov 2026

News · 18 Nov 2026

Overview

For three days in Guangzhou, more than a thousand delegates from sixty-odd countries were told to brace for a tighter market. Speaking at the IATA Aviation Energy Forum on 10-12 November, Rob Macleod, global head of commodity risk solutions at Hartree Partners, offered grounds for near-term optimism but a blunt warning about what comes after it: with jet fuel inventories at exceptionally low levels and refining flexibility exhausted, any renewed disruption tied to the Middle East or Russia could push the market back into deficit in 2027. A single hurricane on the US Gulf Coast, he suggested, might be enough to expose how little spare refining capacity exists and set off another price spike.

Within five trading sessions, Brent crude had fallen to $93 and the jet fuel benchmark had slipped below $150 a barrel. Measured against the start of November, Brent is down about 22% and WTI about 18%. The International Energy Agency, which had spent the year warning of shortage, flipped its fourth-quarter forecast to a surplus of 1.7 million barrels a day. Goldman Sachs put next year’s average Brent at $88 and predicted $78 by December 2027. On the face of it, the forum’s warning was overtaken by events before the delegates had cleared customs.

That reading is too simple, and it misses what the Guangzhou meeting was actually about. The two facts — a conference warning of 2027 scarcity, and a crude market collapsing into surplus — are not in contradiction. They describe the same market from opposite ends. Crude has fallen because the Strait of Hormuz is reopening and because the barrels that were stranded behind it are moving again. Jet fuel has fallen much less, because the constraint that produced this year’s record refining margins was never really about crude availability. It was about distillate: too little refining capacity, too much diesel demand competing for the same molecules, and inventories that a single disruption can empty.

That distinction is the difference between a headline and a bill. An airline buying fuel does not pay Brent. It pays a product price set by the marginal cargo in Singapore, Rotterdam or the US Gulf, and the spread between that price and crude is where this year’s damage was done. The crack averaged $72 a barrel globally in September, according to S&P Global Energy. It is expected to average $74 in the fourth quarter, then $51 in the first quarter of 2027 and $40 in the second — a forecast that assumes the physical system repairs itself on a schedule no one has yet been able to deliver.

This article examines what the Guangzhou forum revealed about the state of the aviation fuel system, what the crude market has done since, and why the divergence between the two is likely to define airline fuel costs well into 2027. It draws on the conference discussions, IATA’s published forecasts, S&P Global Energy’s November outlook, Platts pricing assessments and the trading data of the past fortnight.

1. A forum held at the turning point

The IATA Aviation Energy Forum is not a trade show. It is the twice-yearly working meeting where airlines and their suppliers settle the commercial, technical and sustainability questions that govern how fuel reaches a wing. IATA describes its three pillars as commercial procurement, technical standards and sustainable development, and the guest list reflects that: carriers, into-plane suppliers, refiners, equipment manufacturers and the technical bodies that write the specifications. This year’s edition, held at the invitation of China Southern Air Holding and China National Aviation Fuel Group, drew more than a thousand participants from over sixty countries.

The choice of Guangzhou was not incidental. China is the second-largest aviation fuel market in the world and the largest single growth market for it, and the host carriers used the platform to make a case about industrial capability rather than simply to welcome delegates. Chen Zhe, deputy general manager of China Southern Air Holding, set out a decarbonisation strategy built around fuel-efficient aircraft, weight reduction, technical modification and disciplined fuel-saving operations, alongside consumer-facing products such as paperless travel, meal-on-demand and passenger carbon offsets. The carrier has also completed a commercial flight of the C919 — the domestically built narrowbody — on sustainable aviation fuel, which is a small step operationally and a large one symbolically.

Zhao Qingchun, general manager of China National Aviation Fuel Group, framed SAF less as a climate obligation than as an energy-security instrument, which is a more interesting argument in a year when supply security has been the dominant commercial concern. He described an SAF industry alliance, a local circular model that converts used cooking oil into fuel, a digital refuelling chain, and a platform called AnchorTrace that tracks the environmental attributes of SAF through the whole chain — an attempt to solve one of the least glamorous but most intractable problems in the sector, which is how to prove and allocate the green claim attached to a physical barrel.

The agenda also covered ground that rarely makes press releases: fuel quality and operational reliability across the terminal-to-aircraft chain, procurement structures for carriers expanding international networks, and the regional supply dynamics of Asia-Pacific. These are the subjects that determine whether an airline can actually get fuel at a station 6,000 kilometres from its hub, at the quality its engines require, on the day its schedule demands.

What gave the meeting its edge was timing. Delegates arrived as the Hormuz crisis was in its most acute phase and as jet cracks were within sight of their September peak. They left as the political track was opening and crude was beginning to break. Several will have flown home having spent three days discussing scarcity in a market that was, at that very moment, beginning to price abundance.

2. What was actually said: the 2027 warning in detail

Macleod’s argument deserves to be set out properly, because it was more nuanced than the headline summary suggests. He accepted that there were reasons for optimism in the near term — and there were, since crude was already falling — but argued that the structural picture had not improved. Global jet fuel inventories had fallen to very low levels, leaving the market exposed to any shock. Spare refining capacity remained scarce. And the geopolitical risks that had produced the year’s disruption, in the Middle East and in Russia, were unresolved.

His hurricane example was well chosen. A storm on the US Gulf Coast is a routine seasonal event, not a strategic crisis. In a normal year it removes a few hundred thousand barrels a day of refining capacity for a week or two, and the market absorbs it from inventory. In a year when inventory no longer exists and the spare capacity to replace it has been run down, the same storm becomes a price event. That is the mechanism by which a market with low stocks converts weather into volatility.

S&P Global Energy’s November outlook supplied the numbers behind the warning. Global jet fuel inventories continued to fall in October as demand exceeded supply. The global jet crack — the margin between jet fuel and crude — averaged $72 a barrel in September. The forecast has it averaging $74 in the fourth quarter of 2026 before declining to $51 in the first quarter of 2027 and $40 in the second. Embedded in that path is an assumption of orderly normalisation: more refining runs, rebuilt stocks, and a return to the kind of margins that prevailed before this year.

The demand side of the same outlook is where the tension sits. S&P expects global jet fuel demand to fall by 255,000 barrels a day in 2026 and then rise by 1.17 million barrels a day in 2027. That is a swing of roughly 1.4 million barrels a day in the rate of change, arriving in a market that is already short of the refining capacity to make the product. If the demand recovery materialises while stocks remain thin, the 2027 scenario the forum warned about is not a tail risk. It is the base case.

The Asia-Pacific detail is the most operationally relevant for this region. In October, the Singapore jet and kerosene crack against Dubai crude rose $10.40 to $66.20 a barrel. Jet’s discount to diesel widened to $8.30 a barrel. Both numbers point the same way: refiners were being paid more for jet and still choosing to make less of it, because diesel paid better still. That is not a market clearing. It is a market rationing by price.

3. The fortnight that reversed the narrative

Between the forum’s closing session and the middle of the following week, the crude market did something it had not done all year: it fell, and kept falling.

Date Developments Settlement
Fri, Nov 6 IRGC declares Hormuz blockaded; second day of covering Brent $98.29, WTI $90.52
Nov 10-12 IATA Aviation Energy Forum, Guangzhou Crude begins to slide on reopening signals
Mon, Nov 16 Reports of restored Hormuz transits; IEA flips Q4 to surplus WTI -3.2%, Brent -3.6%
Tue, Nov 17 API reports second consecutive large crude build Brent $93.14 (+0.76%), WTI $86.01 (+0.34%)
Wed, Nov 18 Asian session; IEA surplus forecast digested Brent ~$93.60 (+1.3%)

The move is best expressed over the month rather than the day. Brent is down roughly 22% in November and WTI about 18%. From the $99 handle reached on 6 November, when the blockade declaration sent prices up for a second session, Brent has given back the entire war premium and rather more. The front of the curve has moved from pricing a chokepoint to pricing a glut.

The speed is instructive. Between 2 November and 18 November the market repriced twice in opposite directions, each time by more than 8% in a session or a week. On 2 November it was diplomacy between Washington and Tehran. On 4 November it was the Democratic sweep in the US midterms. On 5 and 6 November it was mines in the strait. From 16 November it was the physical reopening of the strait itself. Not one of those moves was driven by a change in the volume of oil consumed or produced that week. All four were driven by a change in the probability attached to future barrels.

What makes the current leg different from the earlier ones is that it is corroborated by physical data rather than by sentiment. This is the first selloff of the sequence that comes with inventory builds, restored flows and a formal forecast revision from a major agency. That should make it more durable than the two that preceded it.

4. Why crude fell: three forces, one direction

The first force is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s foreign minister said member states supported a “two-day plan” for restoring navigation, language that matters because it implies a mechanical sequence — mine clearance, corridor designation, insurance resumption — rather than an aspirational communiqué. The evidence from the water is consistent: EIA data show crude and fuel volumes transported through the strait rising by 4 million barrels a day in the third quarter compared with the second. The chokepoint is still dangerous, and attacks have not stopped. The IRGC reported on 16 November that two more tankers struck mines and exploded, with six further vessels catching fire on the Sunday and Monday. But danger and closure are different states, and the market has begun to price the second rather than the first.

The second force is the IEA’s forecast revision. The agency now expects the global market to run a surplus of 1.7 million barrels a day in the fourth quarter, with supply averaging 105 million barrels a day, against a previous expectation of deficit. That single change removes the analytical foundation for a war premium. If the world is oversupplied by 1.7 million barrels a day, then a disruption of a few hundred thousand barrels a day is a logistics problem rather than a price crisis.

The third force is the inventory data. US commercial crude stocks rose 4.66 million barrels in the week to 6 November, ending five consecutive weeks of draws. The API subsequently reported a build of 5.28 million barrels for the week to 13 November, following 8.97 million barrels the week before. Two consecutive large builds, with gasoline building alongside, is what the start of a surplus looks like in the data rather than in the forecast.

Goldman Sachs summarised the consequence for the curve: Brent averaging $88 next year and falling to $78 by December 2027, with the normalisation of the supply-demand balance applying downward pressure, offset in the near term by the risk of further attacks on Middle East shipping. That is a forecast for a market that grinds lower while remaining capable of violent spikes — which is, functionally, the definition of a market with low inventories and no spare capacity.

5. Why jet fuel has fallen less than crude

The jet fuel market has fallen, but not by as much, and the arithmetic of that gap is the most commercially important number in the complex right now. Global jet assessments have slipped below $150 a barrel for the first time since the summer. Against Brent at $93, that implies a crack in the high fifties to low sixties — down from $72 in September and below S&P’s $74 forecast for the current quarter.

Read that carefully, because it contains two opposing signals. On the one hand, the crack has compressed by more than $10 a barrel, which means the product market is finally easing. Refiners are running more, cargoes are moving, and the panic premium that attached to every barrel of kerosene in October is coming out. On the other hand, a crack in the high fifties is still roughly two and a half times the $20-30 range that prevailed through 2025. The market has moved from crisis to severe tightness, not from crisis to normal.

The reason the crack has not collapsed is that its causes were never purely geopolitical. Three of them are structural and slow-moving. First, refining capacity: the world has less distillate upgrading capacity relative to demand than it did before the pandemic, and the capacity that closed did not come back. Second, location: the refining capacity that exists has shifted towards Asia and the Middle East, which lengthens supply routes to importing regions and increases the freight and working-capital cost embedded in every delivered barrel. Third, competition from diesel, which is the subject of the next section and, in the view of most participants at Guangzhou, the single most important variable in the jet market for 2027.

There is also a composition effect that is easy to miss when reading headline cracks. Jet and kerosene are assessed together in most Asian benchmarks, and the balance between the two shifts seasonally. As northern hemisphere winter approaches, kerosene for heating competes with jet for the same cut, which supports the benchmark even as aviation demand softens seasonally. An airline buying jet in November is, in a real sense, bidding against a household heating oil market.

The practical consequence for a carrier is that the relief from falling crude is smaller than the headline suggests. If Brent falls 22% and the jet crack compresses by 15%, the delivered fuel price falls by considerably less than 22%. That gap is precisely what the hedging programmes of the last two years were not designed to capture, and it is why so many airlines are reporting higher fuel costs in a quarter when crude is collapsing.

6. Diesel is the swing factor

Middle distillates are a single pool. Jet, diesel and gasoil are produced from overlapping cuts and compete for the same hydrotreating and hydrocracking capacity. When diesel is tight, refiners maximise diesel and jet becomes the by-product that gets trimmed. When diesel is weak, the reverse happens.

The past year has been an extended diesel squeeze. Middle East exports fell sharply as refineries were damaged and runs cut. Russia imposed and repeatedly extended restrictions on diesel exports, which removed a major supplier from the European and, indirectly, the global balance. Refiners responded rationally, at the level of the individual plant and irrationally at the level of the system: each one maximised diesel, and the collective result was a jet market that could not get enough product even at $70 cracks.

The price evidence is unambiguous. In Asia in October, jet’s discount to diesel widened to $8.30 a barrel. Jet was cheaper than diesel and still scarce, which is only possible when supply is being deliberately diverted. Platts assessed the spread between northwest European CIF and Singapore FOB jet and kerosene cargoes at $30.33 a barrel on 11 November, up from $26.10 the previous day — a widening that reflects both freight and the absence of arbitrage cargoes that would normally close the gap.

This is why the Guangzhou discussion kept returning to diesel. A jet fuel buyer cannot solve a diesel problem. But a diesel problem can certainly determine a jet fuel price, and until Russian export policy normalises and Middle East refining recovers, the jet market will remain hostage to a product it does not control. The forum’s forecast of a $51 crack in the first quarter of 2027 implicitly assumes that this competition eases. If it does not, the first quarter could surprise to the upside in the same way that every quarter of 2026 has.

7. The hedging bill comes due

If the Guangzhou meeting had a single practical theme beneath the formal agenda, it was hedging — specifically, the discovery that most airlines hedged the wrong thing.

IATA’s own numbers frame the problem. The association forecast an average 2026 jet fuel price of $152 a barrel, nearly 70% above 2025. That translates into a global fuel bill of about $350 billion, up 39.3% year on year, or 31.4% of operating costs. Net industry profit was cut in June to $23 billion from $41 billion, implying $4.50 of profit per passenger against $9.10 in 2025. Willie Walsh, IATA’s director general, put it without ornament: “All airlines’ final results are being hurt by the rapid 70% rise in jet fuel prices.”

The regional pattern matters. IATA data show European and Asian fuel prices running roughly $5-10 a barrel above the global average, and North American prices $5-10 below it, with US carriers hedging less than the rest of the world. That combination — higher price, more hedging in Europe and Asia; lower price, less hedging in North America — means the same global shock hit different carriers through different channels.

Ryanair provides the cleanest illustration of why hedging did not solve the problem. In the first half of its 2027 financial year, fuel and oil costs rose 15% to €3.40 billion despite the airline having hedged 80% of its requirement. The explanation is the one that matters: the price of the unhedged 20% doubled. A hedge protects the hedged share and nothing else, and when the tail of the book moves by 100%, an 80% coverage ratio still produces a double-digit cost increase.

American Airlines shows the same mechanism from the other direction. Third-quarter fuel costs reached $4.6 billion against $2.7 billion a year earlier, an increase of 67.5%, at an average price of $1.02 a litre; the carrier posted a net loss of $269 million. For the fourth quarter it guided to about $1.24 a litre, which implies fuel spending some $2.8 billion higher than in the fourth quarter of 2025, and signalled that 2027 network capacity growth would be below 2026 levels. Qantas raised its second-half fuel cost expectation from A$2.5 billion to A$3.1-3.3 billion and trimmed domestic capacity. Air New Zealand described fuel at more than twice normal levels and cut flights.

The consequence has been passed to passengers unevenly. EU airfares rose 5.8% year on year in September; US fares rose more than 20%. Michael O’Leary warned in October that European carriers, including Ryanair, were not well hedged through the summer of 2027, and forecast fares rising 15-20%. Spirit Airlines became the first casualty of the cycle in June. IATA is expected to revise its industry profit forecast again in December, and the direction of that revision — in a quarter when crude fell 22% — will be one of the more telling data points of the year.

8. What Guangzhou said about the industrial base

Beyond the price discussion, the forum served as a statement of intent from the Chinese aviation fuel supply chain, and it is worth taking seriously because China’s role in the Asian product balance is growing rather than shrinking.

China National Aviation Fuel’s account of its own operations described an integrated approach: an SAF industry alliance, a local circular model converting used cooking oil into fuel, digital management of the refuelling chain, and AnchorTrace, a platform for tracking the environmental attributes of SAF through the entire process. The last of these addresses a problem that has quietly become a bottleneck. SAF’s value to an airline depends on being able to prove and claim the emissions reduction, and doing that across a supply chain that includes collectors, refiners, blenders, logistics providers and into-plane operators requires a data architecture that most markets still lack. Airlines at Guangzhou were candid that the bookkeeping, not the chemistry, is what slows adoption.

China Southern’s contribution was operational. The carrier described a decarbonisation framework spanning flight operations, ground handling and industrial coordination, with fuel-efficiency gains taken from aircraft acquisition, weight reduction, technical modification and disciplined operating procedures. It also confirmed a commercial C919 flight on SAF — the first meaningful demonstration that the domestic aircraft programme and the domestic fuel programme can be joined up.

The significance is not that China has solved SAF. It has not. The significance is that the Chinese supply chain is positioning itself as a producer and exporter of the fuel rather than only a consumer, at a time when European mandates are creating structural demand that European production cannot meet. For a trading house, that is the commercial signal in the conference: the molecules will increasingly flow east to west, and the certification and bookkeeping infrastructure will determine who can sell them.

9. The SAF paradox: a falling crude price makes the green premium worse

There is an awkward arithmetic in sustainable aviation fuel that the crude selloff has made considerably more awkward, and it received less attention at Guangzhou than it deserves.

SAF has consistently traded at a multiple of conventional jet fuel, reflecting feedstock cost, limited production, the expense of certification and the absence of scale. The premium is usually discussed as a percentage — SAF costs two or three times what jet costs — which is the natural way to talk about it in a policy context, where mandates are set as a share of consumption and penalties are levied per tonne of deficit.

But a percentage is not what a procurement desk manages. A procurement desk manages dollars per tonne, and here the arithmetic turns against the technology precisely when crude falls. If SAF carries a fixed premium of, say, several hundred dollars a tonne over conventional jet, then a 22% fall in the jet price does not reduce that premium at all. It increases it as a share of the total bill. An airline that had budgeted a green premium equal to 1.5% of its fuel cost may now be facing 2% or more, not because SAF became more expensive, but because everything else became cheaper.

This matters for the offtake agreements now being negotiated. Contracts written as a percentage of the jet benchmark see their dollar value fall with crude, which hurts producers and encourages them to renegotiate. Contracts written as a fixed dollar premium see their relative burden rise, which hurts airlines and encourages them to slow their uptake. Neither structure is stable in a market that has moved from $190 to $150 in six weeks, and the industry has not yet settled on a structure that is.

Guangzhou’s contribution to this problem was procedural rather than economic. AnchorTrace and the broader push towards digital tracking of environmental attributes are attempts to make the green premium auditable, which is a precondition for allocating it — between airline and passenger, between carrier and corporate customer, between one state’s mandate and another’s. The forum’s participants were clear that the cost question is now the binding constraint on adoption, not the technical one. The fuel works. The question is who pays the difference, and in a falling market the difference is a larger share of a smaller number.

10. Geography, freight and the Asia-Pacific discount

The regional supply dynamics session addressed a subject that rarely gets a headline but drives a material share of the cost base for carriers outside the Atlantic basin: the cost of moving product to where it is needed, and the fragility of the arbitrages that make that movement economic.

The northwest Europe to Singapore spread is the clearest gauge. At $30.33 a barrel on 11 November, up from $26.10 the day before, it describes a market in which European buyers are paying a substantial premium to attract cargoes that would otherwise sail east, or Asian buyers are being priced out of western barrels. Either way, the widening reflects a physical shortage of clean product in one basin and a freight market that has become expensive enough to blunt the arbitrage that would normally correct it.

For Australian carriers buying on a Singapore benchmark, the exposure is direct and uncomfortable. A widening NWE-Singapore spread combined with elevated MR freight means the delivered cost of fuel at Sydney can rise even when the Singapore assessment is flat. Qantas’s decision to raise its fuel cost guidance and trim capacity in the same quarter is a rational response to exactly this configuration.

The longer-term trend identified at the forum is the westward shift of refining capacity towards Asia and the Middle East, which lengthens supply routes for everyone else. Longer routes mean more tonne-miles of clean product demand, more exposure to chokepoints, and more working capital tied up in cargoes that are at sea rather than in tanks. All of that is embedded in the price an importer pays and none of it appears in a Brent quote.

There is a strategic implication that trading houses are better placed to act on than airlines. In a market where the marginal barrel travels further, the value of physical positioning — tank capacity at the right hub, term arrangements with the right refiner, the ability to blend and store — rises relative to the value of paper. The participants who will manage the next disruption best are those who own or control the logistics, not those who merely price the risk.

11. What to watch between now and the first quarter

Four items will determine whether the Guangzhou warning or the November collapse proves to be the better guide to 2027.

The durability of the reopening. The “two-day plan” language is encouraging, but a strait that has been mined, attacked and insured at war rates does not return to normal on a diplomatic timetable. The relevant indicators are the count of attacks reported by UKMTO, the resumption of war-risk cover at normal rates, and the volume of crude and product actually transiting. A reopening that holds for a month is a different market from one that holds for a week, and the difference will show up first in the front-month spreads rather than in the headline price.

The December IATA revision. IATA cut its 2026 industry profit forecast to $23 billion in June, when fuel was at its worst. It is expected to update that number in December, after a quarter in which crude fell 22% but cracks stayed elevated, and in which North American carriers reported fuel costs up two-thirds year on year. The revision is the cleanest test of how much of the year’s damage was crude and how much was product. If the number improves materially, the crack was the story and it is now easing. If it does not, the industry’s cost base has structurally reset.

The OPEC+ meeting on 29 November. The group held an online session on 16 November to discuss assessments of members’ maximum sustainable capacity, and the full meeting will address the 2027 production framework. Actual delivered volumes matter far more than headline quotas, given that several members have been producing well below their allowances. A framework that signals restraint into 2027 would put a floor under crude that the IEA’s surplus forecast currently denies.

Inventories, in both crude and product. The crude builds of the past two weeks are the first genuine evidence of surplus. The product side has not followed. Global jet stocks continued to fall in October. Until middle distillate inventories in Singapore, ARA and Fujairah rebuild, the crack will keep a floor that crude no longer has — and the airline bill will keep reflecting a market that is oversupplied in one product and short in another.

Conclusion: two markets, one bill

The Guangzhou forum and the November selloff are usually read as a forecast that failed. They are better read as a forecast that was correct about the wrong variable, and that distinction has real commercial consequences.

The forum was right that the physical system is fragile. Inventories are low, spare refining capacity is scarce, diesel competes with jet for the same molecules, and the geography of refining has moved further from the consumers who need it. None of that has been fixed by a 22% fall in Brent. What the market did in the past fortnight was remove a war premium from crude, not repair a distillate system. The IEA’s surplus is a crude balance, not a product balance, and the two have diverged all year.

The forum was wrong, or at least early, about the timing of the next squeeze. A reopening of Hormuz plus a surplus in crude is a powerful combination, and it has taken $20 off the barrel in three weeks. But the crack has compressed by only a fraction of that, which means the delivered price of jet fuel has fallen much less than the headline number, and airlines whose hedging covered crude rather than product have captured only part of the relief.

For the industry gathered in Guangzhou, the practical lesson is about which exposure to hedge. The year’s damage came from the refining margin, not from the crude price, and the instruments that address a margin are different from those that address a barrel. Term supply, product-side derivatives, freight cover and earlier nomination are the tools that would have protected a fuel book in 2026. Most carriers bought the other kind of protection and discovered, like Ryanair with its 80% coverage and its doubled tail, that partial cover in the wrong instrument is not cover at all.

For the market more broadly, the next six months will resolve a question that has been open since the spring: whether the record margins of 2026 were a war story or a capacity story. If the answer is war, cracks should decay towards S&P’s $51 and then $40 as the strait normalises and stocks rebuild. If the answer is capacity, they will find a floor well above the historical range and stay there, and the 2027 warning issued in Guangzhou will look prescient rather than premature.

The evidence so far is mixed but leans towards capacity. A 22% collapse in crude, a formal surplus forecast from the IEA and two consecutive weeks of inventory builds have between them taken only about $10 off the jet crack. A market that gives up that little ground when its feedstock falls that far is not a market returning to normal. It is a market that has been short of product for a year and has not yet found a way to stop being short.